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Court held, in a plurality opinion, that a foreign manufacturer
was not subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey, because the manu-
facturer did not engage in any forum-directed conduct targeting
New Jersey and thus did not purposefully avail itself of the bene-
fits and protections of New Jersey law.
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I. THE FACTS OF MCINTYRE
Robert Nicastro was operating a metal-shearing machine manu-
factured by J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. ("J. McIntyre") when he
sustained a serious injury to his hand.' J. McIntyre is a manufac-
turer of metal-shearing machines that is incorporated and has its
principal place of business in England.2 However, Nicastro's acci-
dent occurred in New Jersey, providing this case with serious ju-
risdictional ramifications.3
II. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF MCINTYRE
Nicastro brought a products liability suit against J. McIntyre in
New Jersey state court.4 In defense, J. McIntyre contended that
New Jersey state courts lacked jurisdiction over the suit, because
J. McIntyre did not market or ship any of its products to New Jer-
sey.' On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled in favor
1. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011) (Kennedy, J.,
plurality). Justice Albin's opinion from the Supreme Court of New Jersey sheds some light
on the factual background of this case. Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d
575, 577-79 (N.J. 2010), rev'd sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780
(2011). Interestingly, Nicastro had been an employee of Curcio Scrap Metal for over thirty
years when he severed several fingers on his right hand while operating the McIntyre Mod-
el 640 Shear. Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 577. Curcio Scrap Metal purchased the McIntyre Mod-
el 640 Shear from McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd. ("McIntyre America"), J. McIntyre's
independent United States distributor, after viewing one at a scrap recycling industry
convention in Las Vegas, Nevada. Id. at 577-78. Notably, J. McIntyre does not sell any of
its products directly to buyers in the United States, with the exception of McIntyre Ameri-
ca. Id. at 579. McIntyre America exclusively sells J. McIntyre products to buyers around
the country. Id.
2. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
3. Id. at 2785-86.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2786. Justice Albin's opinion from the Supreme Court of New Jersey also
provided more details regarding the procedural history of this case. Nicastro, 987 A.2d at
577-79. Nicastro brought this products liability suit against J. McIntyre and its indepen-
dent distributor, McIntyre America, alleging that the McIntyre Model 640 Shear that
caused Nicastro's injury was defective. Id. at 577-78. Nicastro argued that his accident
occurred because the machine was defective, not fit for its intended use, and that it did not
contain proper directions or warnings. Id. at 578. The trial court granted J. McIntyre's
motion to dismiss, finding that New Jersey's exercise of jurisdiction over J. McIntyre would
be inappropriate, based on J. McIntyre's lack of 'sufficient minimum contacts" with New
Jersey. Id. The trial court held that J. McIntyre could not be subject to the jurisdiction of
New Jersey, even under a "liberal" construction of the "stream of commerce" theory and
that J. McIntyre could only be held subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey if it 'purposefully
availed itself' of the benefits of New Jersey law. Id. at 578-79. The Appellate Division
reversed the trial court, finding that J. McIntyre engaged in conduct purposefully directed
at the entire United States market and that J. McIntyre should have known one of its ma-
chines could end up in New Jersey. Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 580. The New Jersey Supreme
Court ultimately affirmed the Appellate Division. Id. at 594.
Winter 2012 J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro
of Nicastro, holding that New Jersey state courts could exercise
jurisdiction over J. McIntyre under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' Relying heavily on the stream of com-
merce analysis articulated by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,7 the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey held the exercise of jurisdiction over J.
McIntyre proper for three reasons: (1) Nicastro sustained his in-
jury in New Jersey; (2) J. McIntyre knew or should have known
that because its products were distributed nationally, its machines
could potentially end up in any of the fifty states; and (3) J. McIn-
tyre did not take any measures to avert the distribution of its
products in New Jersey.8
J. McIntyre appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States, and the Court granted certiorari to answer the question of
whether a state could exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant, when that defendant was not within the state either
when the complainant suffered injury or when the suit com-
menced, and additionally, did not consent to the jurisdiction of the
forum state.9 The Supreme Court aimed to bring clarity to the
rules regarding the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign defen-
dant that the Court left muddled in the Asahi decision. °
At oral argument, J. McIntyre presented three principal reasons
why New Jersey's exercise of jurisdiction was inappropriate: (1)
that while it does sell its machines to an independent distributor
in the United States, who subsequently sells the machines to buy-
ers across the country, J. McIntyre itself does not sell any of its
6. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., plurality). The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
7. 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (O'Connor, J., plurality).
8. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., plurality). Justice Kennedy defined the
stream of commerce as "the movement of goods from manufacturers through distributors to
consumers." Id. at 2788. In Asahi, the Supreme Court utilized a stream of commerce anal-
ysis in an attempt to delineate the rule for when a state may exercise jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant. 480 U.S. at 105 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
9. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
10. Id. (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105-16 (O'Connor, J., plurality), 116-21 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)). The Supreme Court's decision in Asahi featured no majority opinion, but
rather a plurality opinion written by Justice O'Connor and a concurring opinion written by
Justice Brennan. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105 (O'Connor, J., plurality). Each set forth opposing
guidelines for states to follow when determining whether a state could exercise jurisdiction
over a foreign defendant, leaving the law on this issue largely open to interpretation. Id.
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products directly to buyers in the United States; (2) that although
representatives of J. McIntyre have attended annual conventions
for the scrap-metal recycling industry in several states, its repre-
sentatives never attended a convention in New Jersey; and (3)
that the record indicates that no more than four, and possibly only
one, of J. McIntyre's machines ended up in New Jersey.1 Based
on these facts, J. McIntyre believed that its contacts were insuffi-
cient to make New Jersey's exercise of jurisdiction over the dis-
pute proper. 12
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINION IN MCINTYRE
A. Justice Kennedy's Plurality Opinion
Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality, overruled the New
Jersey Supreme Court's decision. 3 Justice Kennedy held that for
a defendant to be subject to another state's jurisdiction, the defen-
dant must have demonstrated conduct specifically targeting the
forum state, thereby benefitting from the protection of that state's
laws.4 Beginning with a brief overview of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Kennedy emphasized that,
generally speaking, the laws of a foreign state do not bind a per-
son or entity.
15
Relying on the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, Justice Kennedy utilized the general rule for a state's ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant as the foundation for
the plurality's holding. 6 This rule provides that a state may only
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant when that defendant
11. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., plurality). This is a confusing part of
Justice Kennedy's opinion. Justice Kennedy cited these three reasons as arguments pro-
vided by Nicastro, supporting New Jersey's exercise of jurisdiction over J. McIntyre. Id.
However, in the paragraph immediately following these three arguments, Justice Kennedy
stated that they were "emphasized" by the petitioner, J. McIntyre. Id. After a careful
reading of these arguments, it is evident that they support J. McIntyre's cause.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2785.
14. Id. at 2787 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). Specifically,
Justice Kennedy provided that a State's exercise of jurisdiction "requires some act by which
the defendant 'purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.'" Id. (quoting Hanson,
357 U.S. at 253).
15. Id. (citing Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 608-09 (1990)).
16. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., plurality) (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945)).
Vol. 50202
Winter 2012 J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro
has at least some minimum contacts with the state.17 The plurali-
ty underscored the idea that in a products-liability suit, it is the
foreign defendant's intentional, forum-directed conduct that
makes a state's exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant consis-
tent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'s
Justice Kennedy next outlined the methods by which a defen-
dant may yield to a state's jurisdiction. 9 For example, a defen-
dant may expressly consent to the exercise of jurisdiction. 2' Addi-
tionally, a defendant consents to a state's jurisdiction when
present in the state during service of process.2 Further, a defen-
dant is subject to the jurisdiction of a state if the defendant is in-
corporated in that state or has its principal place of business in
that state.22 The vital similarity to each of these methods, Justice
Kennedy argued, is that each of the methods demonstrates the
intent on the part of the defendant to benefit from and yield to the
laws of the forum state.2 Additionally, the plurality noted that
these scenarios are situations in which a state may exercise gen-
eral jurisdiction over a defendant and adjudicate issues that arose
both within and outside of the state.24 Importantly, Justice Ken-
nedy emphasized that a foreign defendant becomes subject to the
personal jurisdiction of a state under the same theory as those
defendants subject to the general jurisdiction of a state.2' The key
is that the foreign defendant must have shown the intent to bene-
fit from and yield to the laws of the forum state.26
However, Justice Kennedy cautioned that there is much ambi-
guity in this area of law, produced by the contrasting opinions of
17. Id. (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). Justice Kennedy provided that "[a] court
may subject a defendant to judgment only when the defendant has sufficient contacts with
the sovereign 'such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice." Id. (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703
(1982)).
21. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., plurality) (citing Burnham v. Super. Ct.,
495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990)).
22. Id. (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853-
54 (2011)).
23. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
24. Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984)).
25. Id. at 2787-88.
26. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787-88 (Kennedy, J., plurality) (quoting Hanson v. Denck-
la, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
203
204 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 50
Justice Brennan and Justice O'Connor in the Asahi decision. 7
The plurality first examined Justice Brennan's concurrence, which
argued that it was sufficient for a defendant to be subject to the
jurisdiction of another state, if that defendant placed its product
into the stream of commerce and knew the product could end up in
the forum state.28 This knowledge, Justice Brennan believed, pro-
vided the defendant with notice that he could be sued in that
state." Justice Kennedy next analyzed Justice O'Connor's plurali-
ty opinion, where Justice O'Connor asserted that a defendant
simply placing its products into the stream of commerce was not
enough to subject that defendant to the jurisdiction of another
state." Justice O'Connor explained that a foreign defendant must
take action specifically targeting the forum state.3
Justice Kennedy agreed with the analysis of Justice O'Connor,
because the Supreme Court has previously and consistently held
that a defendant's action, not expectation, subjects him to another
state's jurisdiction.32 Therefore, the plurality held that whether a
27. Id. at 2785 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 107 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., plurality)).
28. Id. at 2788 (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring)). Justice Ken-
nedy focused on Justice Brennan's foreseeability approach, as explained in Justice Bren-
nan's concurring opinion. Id. Specifically, Justice Kennedy, quoting Justice Brennan,
provided:
[Als that concurrence contended, "jurisdiction premised on the placement of a product
into the stream of commerce [without more] is consistent with the Due Process
Clause," for "[als long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product
is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come
as a surprise."
Id. (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring)). Justice Kennedy goes on to
argue that, "[i]t was the premise of the concurring opinion that the defendant's ability to
anticipate suit renders the assertion of jurisdiction fair. In this way, the opinion made
foreseeability the touchstone of jurisdiction." Id. (emphasis added).
29. Id. (citingAsahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
30. Id. at 2788-89 (quotingAsahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O'Connor, J., plurality)).
31. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788-89 (Kennedy, J., plurality) (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at
112 (O'Connor, J., plurality)). Justice Kennedy focused on the "purposefully availed" stan-
dard articulated by Justice O'Connor. Id. at 2789. Justice Kennedy stated:
The "substantial connection" between the defendant and the forum State necessary
for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State. The placement of a product into the
stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully di-
rected toward the forum State.
Id. at 2788-89 (quotingAsahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O'Connor, J., plurality)).
32. Id. at 2789. Justice Kennedy went so far as to comment that Justice Brennan,
advocating a rule based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability, is inconsistent
with the premises of lawful judicial power." Id. Importantly, Justice Kennedy provided the
following key language: "[tihis Court's precedents make clear that it is the defendant's
actions, not his expectations, that empower a State's courts to subject him to judgment." Id.
(emphasis added).
J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro
defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of another state is based on
whether the defendant specifically targeted the forum state, ra-
ther than the defendant's expectation of suit in that state. Ra-
tionalizing his viewpoint, Justice Kennedy believed that it would
not be appropriate to use Justice Brennan's foreseeability ap-
proach, because each individual state is a separate and distinct
sovereign entity.34 Justice Kennedy argued that Justice Brennan's
standard had the potential to disrupt state sovereignty by permit-
ting the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant who never
purposefully availed itself of the forum state.35
In the case at bar, the plurality found that, while J. McIntyre
targeted the United States in its sales and marketing efforts, it
never engaged in conduct that intentionally targeted New Jersey.
According to Justice Kennedy, the facts that J. McIntyre utilized
an independent distributor in the United States, attended scrap
recycling trade shows in the United States, and had machines in
operation in New Jersey were not sufficient enough to demon-
strate that J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the New Jer-
sey market. 37 Because the plurality found the Supreme Court of
New Jersey's holding, that J. McIntyre did not have contacts in
New Jersey, to be of significance, 8 the plurality determined that
New Jersey's exercise of jurisdiction was inappropriate and a vi-
olation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
B. Justice Breyer's Concurrence
Justice Breyer authored a concurring opinion to express his dis-
agreement with the plurality's rationale, because Justice Breyer
(1) believed that this case could be decided on Supreme Court
precedent alone; and (2) found the decision from the New Jersey
33. Id.
34. Id. Justice Kennedy argued the importance of individual state sovereignty and its
relationship to the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, as follows:
If the defendant is a domestic domiciliary, the courts of its home State are available
and can exercise general jurisdiction. And if another State were to assert jurisdiction
in an inappropriate case, it would upset the federal balance, which posits that each
State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful intrusion by other States.
Id.
35. Id. at 2790.
36. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2791.
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Supreme Court unpersuasive.0 Although he believed this case
could have been decided on precedent alone, Justice Breyer dis-
tanced himself from the plurality by noting the importance of ex-
amining global economic trends when evaluating the rules of ju-
risdiction over a foreign defendant.41 Moreover, he contended that
this case did not provide the Court with the opportunity to conduct
such an examination, making the plurality's rule unwarranted.42
Justice Breyer determined that the facts were insufficient to
demonstrate the minimum contacts required for New Jersey to
exercise jurisdiction over J. McIntyre.43 Based on this Court's de-
cision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson," Justice
Breyer argued that the limited sale of a foreign defendant's prod-
ucts or machinery in a state was inadequate to allow that state to
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.45 Justice Breyer believed
that Nicastro failed to meet his burden of proof on the issue of
whether J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of New Jersey's
laws and market.46 From this viewpoint, Justice Breyer needed no
further analysis to decide that J. McIntyre was not subject to ju-
risdiction in New Jersey. 7
40. Id. at 2791-93 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Alito joined Justice Breyer's concur-
ring opinion. Id.
41. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
42. Id. Justice Breyer specifically emphasized the "many recent changes in commerce
and communication, many of which are not anticipated by our precedents. But this case
does not present any of those issues. So [hel think[s] it unwise to announce a rule of broad
applicability without full consideration of the modern-day consequences." Id.
43. Id. Justice Breyer firmly believed that the "facts do not provide contacts between
the British firm and the State of New Jersey constitutionally sufficient to support New
Jersey's assertion of jurisdiction in this case." Id.
44. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
45. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing World-Wide Volkswa-
gen, 444 U.S. at 297). Justice Breyer stated:
None of our precedents finds that a single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the
kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient. Rather, this Court's previous hold-
ings suggest the contrary. The Court has held that a single sale to a customer who
takes an accident-causing product to a different State (where the accident takes
place) is not a sufficient basis for asserting jurisdiction.
Id.
46. Id. Justice Breyer pointedly stated:
Mr. Nicastro, who here bears the burden of proving jurisdiction, has shown no specif-
ic effort by the British Manufacturer to sell in New Jersey. He has introduced no list
of potential New Jersey customers who might, for example, have regularly attended
trade shows. And he has not otherwise shown that the British Manufacturer "pur-
posefully availled] itself of the privilege of conducting activities" within New Jersey,
or that it de-livered its goods in the stream of commerce "with the expectation that
they will be purchased" by New Jersey users.
Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98) (alteration in original).
47. Id. at 2792-93.
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While Justice Breyer did not agree with the plurality's rigid rule
of exercising jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, he was increa-
singly underwhelmed by the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of
New Jersey.48 Justice Breyer believed that the New Jersey Su-
preme Court's rule would make it too easy for a state to exercise
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.49 Specifically, Justice Breyer
disfavored the scenario created by the New Jersey rule, where a
state would be able to exercise jurisdiction over any foreign defen-
dant manufacturer who maintains no contacts with the state, but
has a single product end up within the state's bounds." Addition-
ally, Justice Breyer found that the New Jersey rule created too
great a burden on manufacturers, both foreign and domestic, be-
cause it would require manufacturers to be prepared to defend
suit under the laws of all fifty states.5' For these reasons, Justice
48. Id. at 2793. Justice Breyer argued that:
[Tihough I do not agree with the plurality's seemingly strict no-jurisdiction rule, I am
not persuaded by the absolute approach adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court
and urged by respondent and his amici. Under that view, a producer is subject to ju-
risdiction for a products-liability action so long as it "knows or reasonably should
know that its products are distributed through a nationwide distribution system that
might lead to those products being sold in any of the fifty states."
Id. (quoting Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., 987 A.2d 575, 592 (N.J. 2010), rev'd sub nom.
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011)).
49. Id.
50. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring). Notably, Justice Breyer ar-
gued the ramifications of adopting the New Jersey rule:
A rule like the New Jersey Supreme Court's would permit every State to assert juris-
diction in a products-liability suit against any domestic manufacturer who sells its
products (made anywhere in the United States) to a national distributor, no matter
how large or small the manufacturer, no matter how distant the forum, and no mat-
ter how few the number of items that end up in the particular forum at issue. What
might appear fair in the case of a large manufacturer which specifically seeks, or ex-
pects, an equal-sized distributor to sell its product in a distant State might seem un-
fair in the case of a small manufacturer (say, an Appalachian potter) who sells his
product (cups and saucers) exclusively to a large distributor, who resells a single item
(a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant State (Hawaii). I know too little about the
range of these or in-between possibilities to abandon in favor of the more absolute
rule what has previously been this Court's less absolute approach.
Id. Justice Breyer used this hypothetical to further clarify why he agreed with the reversal
of the New Jersey Supreme Court. Id.
51. Id. at 2794. Justice Breyer also voiced his concern about the potential burden of
the New Jersey rule on foreign manufacturers:
It may be fundamentally unfair to require a small Egyptian shirt maker, a Brazilian
manufacturing cooperative, or a Kenyan coffee farmer, selling its products through
international distributors, to respond to products-liability tort suits in virtually every
State in the United States, even those in respect to which the foreign firm has no
connection at all but the sale of a single (allegedly defective) good. And a rule like
the New Jersey Supreme Court suggests would require every product manufacturer,
large or small, selling to American distributors to understand not only the tort law of
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Breyer agreed with the decision to reverse the Supreme Court of
New Jersey, but he did not support the plurality's rationale.52
C. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion in which she voiced
her strong disagreement with both Justice Kennedy's plurality
opinion and Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, arguing that J.
McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the entire United States
market and was, therefore, subject to the specific jurisdiction of
any of the fifty states.53 Additionally, Justice Ginsburg believed
that the reversal of the Supreme Court of New Jersey allowed for-
eign defendants, especially manufacturers, to easily elude jurisdic-
tion in a state where its products were sold and caused harm.54
Justice Ginsburg argued, after analyzing all of the facts availa-
ble to her in the case, that J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself
of the entire United States market.55 Justice Ginsburg determined
that J. McIntyre's actions demonstrated the intent to solicit cus-
tomers from all fifty states.56 This notion, Justice Ginsburg be-
lieved, showed that J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the
entire United States market, thereby subjecting it to jurisdiction
in any state. 7




53. Id. at 2794-97. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined Justice Ginsburg's dissenting
opinion. Id.
54. Id. at 2794-95.
55. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794-97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In this section of Justice
Ginsburg's dissent, she utilized many more facts than originally provided by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey. Id. Justice Ginsburg drew from varying fact sources, such as the
complaint and interrogatories. Id. Justice Ginsburg's analysis of the facts focused on sev-
eral different aspects of the case, such as J. McIntyre's regular attendance at conventions
for the scrap metal industry, J. McIntyre's utilization of McIntyre America, J. McIntyre's
independent United States distributor, and J. McIntyre's overall desire to solicit business
from any potential customer in the United States. Id. at 2796. Additionally, Justice Gins-
burg described New Jersey as a major player in the scrap recycling industry. Id. at 2795.
56. Id. at 2797. Justice Ginsburg specifically argued that, "[gliven McIntyre UKs en-
deavors to reach and profit from the United States market as a whole, Nicastro's suit, I
would hold, has been brought in a forum entirely appropriate for the adjudication of his
claim." Id.
57. Id. Justice Ginsburg provided her analysis of J. McIntyre's forum directed conduct
as follows:
The machine arrived in Nicastro's New Jersey workplace not randomly or fortuitous-
ly, but as a result of the U.S. connections and distribution system that McIntyre UK
deliberately arranged. On what sensible view of the allocation of adjudicatory au-
thority could the place of Nicastro's injury within the United States be deemed off
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Justice Ginsburg was also concerned that the reversal of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey would allow foreign manufacturers
to escape jurisdiction in states where their products caused
harm." The dissent strongly believed that forcing a foreign defen-
dant to defend suit in a state where its products caused harm was
reasonable, especially where that defendant has knowledge that
its products could reach a state by distribution through the stream
of commerce.59 Justice Ginsburg believed that this concept had no
potential affect on the sovereign authority of each individual state,
because it would be reasonable to expect a defendant, whose prod-
uct caused injury in another state, to defend suit in that state."
Finally, Justice Ginsburg considered the issue involved in this
case to be unique, distinguishing this case from other important
jurisdiction cases, such as World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi.6"
limits for his products liability claim against a foreign manufacturer who targeted
the United States (including all the States that constitute the Nation) as the territory
it sought to develop?
Id. (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 2795.
59. Id. at 2800-01. Justice Ginsburg posed several important questions regarding the
exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, including:
Is it not fair and reasonable, given the mode of trading of which this case is an exam-
ple, to require the international seller to defend at the place its products cause in-
jury? Do not litigational convenience and choice-of-law considerations point in that
direction? On what measure of reason and fairness can it be considered undue to re-
quire McIntyre UK to defend in New Jersey as an incident of its efforts to develop a
market for its industrial machines anywhere and everywhere in the United States?
Is not the burden on McIntyre UK to defend in New Jersey fair, i.e., a reasonable cost
of transacting business internationally, in comparison to the burden on Nicastro to go
to Nottingham, England to gain recompense for an injury he sustained using McIn-
tyre's product at his workplace in Saddle Brook, New Jersey?
Id. (internal citations removed).
60. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg empha-
sized her viewpoint, arguing that "[iindeed, among States of the United States, the State in
which the injury occurred would seem most suitable for litigation of a products liability tort
claim." Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
61. Id. at 2802-03 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288-89, 295-98; Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (O'Connor, J., plurality)). Justice
Ginsburg made the argument that the case at bar is dissimilar to two of the most important
jurisdictional cases out of the United States Supreme Court. Id. (citing World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288-89, 295-98; Asahi, 480 U.S. at 109). Justice Ginsburg noted
that World-Wide Volkswagen arose out of a case involving "a New York car dealership that
sold solely in the New York market, and a New York distributor who supplied retailers in
three States only: New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey." Id. at 2802 (citing World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 289). New York residents purchased a car from the New
York dealer and the car caught on fire in Oklahoma causing an accident. Id. (citing World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288). The Court, according to Justice Ginsburg, held that
jurisdiction could not be based on the unilateral actions of the customer. McIntyre, 131 S.
Ct. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298).
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg stated that Asahi involved two foreign parties and arose
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Hence, Justice Ginsburg argued that the decision from the New
Jersey Supreme Court did not violate any precedent set forth from
the Supreme Court of the United States.62 Therefore, Justice
Ginsburg dissented, because she found enough significant contacts
between J. McIntyre and New Jersey to determine that it was ap-
propriate to subject J. McIntyre to the jurisdiction of the New Jer-
61sey state courts.
IV. THE HISTORY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND PRECEDENT
LEADING TO MCINTYRE
The United States Supreme Court first extensively addressed
matters of personal jurisdiction in Pennoyer v. Neff." In Pennoyer,
the Supreme Court held that, in general, a state has exclusive ju-
risdiction over the people and property within its borders and that
no state could exercise jurisdiction over the people and property of
other states without the defendant either voluntarily appearing in
court in the forum state or receiving personal service of process."
After Pennoyer, the Supreme Court would not address the issue of
personal jurisdiction in a significant manner for another sixty-
eight years, when the Court would face the critical question of how
a state could obtain jurisdiction over a defendant from another
state.66
A. International Shoe Co. v. Washington
In the landmark International Shoe decision, the Supreme
Court held the International Shoe Company ("company") subject
to jurisdiction in Washington, even though the company was in-
"over a transaction that took place outside the United States." Id. at 2802-03. Justice
Ginsburg argued that "[t]o hold that Asahi controls this case would, to put it bluntly, be
dead wrong." Id. at 2803.
62. Id. at 2802.
63. Id. at 2804.
64. 95 U.S. 714, 722, 726 (1877).
65. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714 at 722. Importantly, Justice Field famously stated "that
every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory. As a consequence, every State has the power to determine for itself the
civil status and capacities of its inhabitants." Id. The majority went on to provide 'that no
State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its
territory." Id. Regarding, service of process, Justice Field argued that "[i]f, without per-
sonal service, judgments in personam, obtained ex parte against non-residents and absent
parties, upon mere publication of process, which, in the great majority of cases, would never
be seen by the parties interested, could be upheld and enforced, they would be the constant
instruments of fraud and oppression." Id. at 726.
66. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 311 (1945).
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corporated in Delaware, with its principal place of business in
Saint Louis, Missouri.67 In International Shoe, the company sold
and manufactured footwear." Although the company did not
manufacture or stock any of its merchandise in Washington, it
had a small group of salesmen that lived in and sold to sales terri-
tories in Washington.69 When the company received notice of as-
sessment for unpaid tax contributions in Washington, it argued in
court to set aside the notice of assessment on the ground that it
was not a citizen of Washington.7
In Chief Justice Stone's opinion, the Supreme Court held that
Washington's exercise of jurisdiction over the company was ap-
propriate, because of the company's contacts with the state.71 Jus-
tice Stone reasoned that the demands of due process require that a
foreign, or out-of-state, defendant have at least sufficient or mini-
mum contacts with the forum state, such that it would be reason-
able to compel the defendant to defend suit in the forum state.72
The majority also provided that a state would have jurisdiction
over a foreign defendant when that defendant's contacts with the
state were systematic and continuous, and the suit arose out of
those contacts.73 Specifically, Justice Stone provided that when a
67. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313, 320.
68. Id. at 313.
69. Id. at 313-14. The company's sales force residing in Washington did not have any
offices in the State. Id. at 313. However, the company did provide its salesmen with sam-
ples to display in rented rooms in business buildings or hotels for the purpose of soliciting
orders. Id. at 313-14. Additionally, the company's sales force in Washington was allowed
to take orders from buyers for acceptance by the company in Saint Louis. Id. at 314. Once
the company approved the orders, the company would ship the filled orders to the buyers in
Washington. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 314.
70. Id. at 312. The company first appeared before a tribunal of the office of unemploy-
ment. Id. The tribunal denied the company's motion to set aside the notice of assessment,
and the Commissioner, as well as the Superior Court, affirmed this decision. Id. at 312-13.
The Washington Supreme Court also affirmed the decision, based on its finding "that the
regular and systematic solicitation of orders in the state by [the company's] salesmen, re-
sulting in a continuous flow of [the company's] product into the state, was sufficient to
constitute doing business in the state so as to make [the company] amenable to suit in its
courts." Id. at 314.
71. Id. at 320.
72. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317. Specifically, Justice Stone argued that the demands of
due process "may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as
make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require the cor-
poration to defend the particular suit which is brought there." Id.
73. Id. Importantly, Justice Stone pointed out that the exercise of jurisdiction "has
never been doubted when the activities of the corporation [in a state] have not only been
continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no
consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given."
Id. However, Justice Stone also noted that "it has been generally recognized that the ca-
sual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activi-
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defendant conducts business, or other activities within a state,
thereby invoking the protection of that state's laws, responsibili-
ties, such as defending suit, manifest in relation to those contacts
with the state.74
The majority found that the company's activities in the state of
Washington were systematic and continuous.75 The Court rea-
soned that these contacts generated a substantial amount of busi-
ness in Washington, thereby leading to the issues that brought
about this suit against the company."6 Therefore, Justice Stone
found that the company's contacts with Washington were suffi-
cient to make the state's exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.7
B. Hanson v. Denckla
The Supreme Court next altered the jurisdictional landscape by
holding that a state could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant with only limited or unintentional contacts with the
forum state.78 In Hanson, the Florida Chancery Court and the
Florida Supreme Court ruled that Florida had jurisdiction over
trust property owned by a recently deceased domiciliary of Florida
but located and held by trustees in Delaware.79 The Supreme
ties in a state in the corporation's behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of
action unconnected with the activities there," and that "[tlo require the corporation in such
circumstances to defend the suit away from its home ... has been thought to lay too great
and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due process." Id. (emphasis
added).
74. Id. at 319. Justice Stone rationalized his ruling providing that:
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities with-
in a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The exercise
of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out
of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires
the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances,
hardly be said to be undue.
Id.
75. Id. at 320.
76. Id.
77. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
78. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 253 (1958).
79. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 238-43. In Hanson, Dora Donner, the plaintiffs mother, origi-
nally a Pennsylvania resident, set up trusts in Delaware that named herself as the benefi-
ciary of the income from the trusts during her lifetime and various Delaware banks as
trustees. Id. at 238. Mrs. Donner then moved to Florida, where she executed a will naming
one of her daughters, Elizabeth Donner Hanson, executor of her will. Id. at 239-40. Mrs.
Hanson named her children, Donner Hanson and Joseph Donner Winsor, as beneficiaries of
two of Mrs. Donner's trusts. Id. at 239. After Mrs. Donner's death, Mrs. Donner's other
daughters, Katherine Denckla and Dorothy Stewart, sued Mrs. Hanson and her children in
Florida State Court to invalidate the distribution of the trusts to Mrs. Hanson's children.
Id. at 240-41. Mrs. Hanson and her children argued that Florida did not have jurisdiction
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Court granted certiorari to determine the extent of contacts neces-
sary to subject a foreign defendant to jurisdiction in another
state." Specifically, in this case, the question arose as to whether
Florida could exercise jurisdiction over trust property held by
trustees in Delaware.81
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, determined that
Florida's exercise of jurisdiction over the trustees in Delaware was
not appropriate.82 Citing International Shoe as a more lenient
standard for the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant,
Justice Warren cautioned that it would be improper, however, to
believe that International Shoe removed all limits to the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. 3 Justice
Warren argued that a foreign defendant must, at least, have min-
imum contacts with the forum state and a suit arising out of those
contacts, for the exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant to be
appropriate.84 Specifically, the majority stated that a non-resident
defendant must intentionally seek to benefit from conducting
business within the forum state, thereby benefiting from the pro-
tection of that state's laws.85
over the suit, because the non-resident trustees lacked sufficient contacts with Florida,
because not all non-resident defendants were personally served with process, and because
the trust was property located in Delaware. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 241-42. Meanwhile, Mrs.
Hanson filed suit in Delaware, seeking a judgment to determine who was entitled to Mrs.
Donner's property that was located in Delaware. Id. at 242. The Florida court ruled in
favor of Denckla and Stewart, enjoining Mrs. Hanson from distributing the trusts, while
the Delaware court ruled that Mrs. Hanson's distribution of the trusts was valid. Id. The
Florida Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction over the trust property, even though it
was in Delaware, because Florida had jurisdiction to interpret Mrs. Donner's will. Id. at
242-43. However, the Delaware Supreme Court did not award full faith and credit to the
Florida decision, because Florida did not have jurisdiction over the trust property. Id. at
243.
80. Id. at 243, 251, 253.
81. Id. at 243.
82. Id. at 254.
83. Id. at 251 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). Specifically,
Justice Warren noted "it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual de-
mise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts." Id. (citing Vanderbilt v.
Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 (1957)).
84. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251 (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). The majority made the
point that "[hiowever minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant
may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the 'minimal contacts' with that State
that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him." Id.
85. Id. at 253 (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). Here, Justice Warren provided that
"it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws." Id.
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Applying his rule to the facts of Hanson, Justice Warren found
the Delaware trust company's contacts with Florida lacking.86 The
majority found that the trust company conducted no business or
transactions in Florida, did not operate in Florida, and did not
seek any business in Florida.87 Furthermore, the suit in Hanson
did not arise out of any contacts that the defendant had in Flori-
da.8' The decedent entered into the trust agreement in Delaware
with a Delaware corporation. 8 In fact, the first contact that the
trust agreement had with Florida did not occur until several years
later, when the decedent executed a will and subsequently died in
Florida. 90 Therefore, Justice Warren ruled that Florida's exercise
of jurisdiction over the Delaware trustees was inappropriate.9'
C. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court analyzed the
concept of foreseeability and its relation to jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant. 2 In this case, the Robinsons, victims of an
automobile accident caused by defective car parts, attempted to
sue the vehicle's distributor, Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. ("Seaway"),
and dealer, World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation ("World-Wide"),
both New York domiciliaries, in Oklahoma state court.93 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the state's exer-
cise of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant was proper, be-
86. Id. at 251.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 252.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 254.
92. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-98 (1980).
93. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288-91. In World-Wide Volkswagen, Harry
and Kay Robinson, New York citizens, bought a car from Seaway in New York. Id. at 288.
While driving the car through Oklahoma, the vehicle caught on fire, seriously burning Kay
Robinson and her children. Id. The Robinsons brought a products-liability suit in Okla-
homa, alleging that the accident occurred due to the car's defective design. Id. In addition
to several other parties, the Robinsons sued World-Wide and Seaway. Id. Both World-
Wide and Seaway were incorporated in New York and had their principal place of business
in New York, only doing business in the northeast United States. World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 288-89. World-Wide and Seaway argued in defense that Oklahoma could not
exercise jurisdiction over them. Id. at 288. The District Court ruled that Oklahoma did
have jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 289. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
ruled that Oklahoma had jurisdiction over the case, because World-Wide and Seaway
should have foreseen that the car, because of its mobile nature, could have been used in
Oklahoma and because the two companies likely profited from their cars possibly being
used in Oklahoma. Id. at 289-90 (emphasis added).
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cause of conflicting decisions among several of the states' highest
courts.94
On appeal, the Court reversed the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
finding that World-Wide and Seaway lacked sufficient contacts to
render Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction appropriate.95 The
Court contemplated the burden on the defendant in defending suit
in another state, as well as several other pertinent jurisdictional
factors.96 Additionally, the Court emphasized the importance of
state sovereignty, exemplified by the Framers, even in the face of
substantial developments and changes in the world economic cli-
mate that caused commerce and trade to take place all across
state lines and the world.97 Therefore, the Court, relying on Inter-
national Shoe, held that a state could not exercise jurisdiction over
a foreign defendant that does not have at least minimum contacts
with the forum state.98
The Supreme Court could not find sufficient contacts between
World-Wide or Seaway and the State of Oklahoma. 9 World-Wide
and Seaway did not have offices or operations in Oklahoma, they
did not target the Oklahoma market in their sales efforts, and
they engaged in no conduct that demonstrated an intent to benefit
from Oklahoma law. °° The Court determined that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court based jurisdiction on the chance occurrence of one
of World-Wide and Seaway's cars ending up in Oklahoma.'
94. Id. at 291.
95. Id. at 299.
96. Id. at 292. Notably, the Supreme Court listed several factors used to determine the
appropriate forum for the litigation of a non-resident defendant, including:
[Tihe burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropri-
ate case be considered in light of other relevant factors, including the forum State's
interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief, at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the
plaintiffs power to choose the forum; the interstate judicial system's interest in ob-
taining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
Id. (citations omitted).
97. Id. at 293-94 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958)). The Court
argued that, despite a transformation in the national economy that some would argue
renders state lines immaterial, "the Framers also intended that the States retain many
essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to try
causes in their courts." Id.
98. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
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The Robinsons did argue that it was foreseeable that a car could
be driven to and cause injury in Oklahoma. 10 2 However, the Court
argued that foreseeability, on its own, was not enough for a state
to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.'8 The
Court did not believe foreseeability to be immaterial; rather, it
argued that the defendant's conduct, activity, and relationship
with the forum state are the more appropriate determining factors
of jurisdiction.!°4 Additionally, the Court reasoned that a state
needed more than a possibility that a defendant's product would
end up in the state to exercise jurisdiction.'0 ' Therefore, according
to the Court, where a defendant purposefully avails itself of, or
has knowledge that its product could reach the forum state, it is
reasonable to subject that defendant to the jurisdiction of the fo-
rum state.06 Finally, because in this case the Court found insuffi-
102. Id.
103. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295. Here, the Supreme Court directly stated
that "'foreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction
under the Due Process Clause." Id.
104. Id. at 297 (citing Kulko v. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)). The Court did stress that foreseeability is a relevant factor in
determining jurisdiction, stating that:
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But the fore-
seeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a
product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's con-
duct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably antic-
ipate being haled into court there.
Id. (citing Kulko, 436 U.S. at 97-98; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216). Here, the Court developed
the relationship between purposeful availment and foreseeability, by showing that purpose-
ful availment could be an important factor in determining whether it was foreseeable for a
non-resident defendant to be haled into court in the forum state. Id.
105. Id. at 298 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). The Court pro-
vided that "the mere 'unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonre-
sident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.'" Id. This
excerpt is important because when read in context with the subsequent sentence, it implies
that jurisdiction over a foreign defendant cannot be based on the actions of the plaintiff, but
only the actions of the defendant. See id. As the Court stated in Hanson:
The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's
activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant
purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (emphasis added).
106. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98. The Court made this assertion be-
cause when a non-resident defendant purposefully avails itself of another state, "it has
clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome
litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the
risks are too great, severing its connection with the State." Id. at 297. Therefore, the Court
reasoned that "Itihe forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause
if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the
stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the
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cient contacts between World-Wide or Seaway and Oklahoma, and
the fact that Oklahoma based jurisdiction on the improbable ap-
pearance of the Robinsons' Volkswagen in Oklahoma, the Court
did not find Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction sustainable. °7
D. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz
The Supreme Court would again face the issue of jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant in 1985.08 In Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, John Rudzewicz and Brian MacShara, citizens of
Michigan, briefly operated a failed Burger King franchise in Mich-
igan.' Burger King terminated the franchise when Rudzewicz
and MacShara fell behind in rent payments and brought suit
against the partners in a federal district court in Florida when
they continued to operate the franchise anyway."0 Rudzewicz and
MacShara argued that Florida lacked jurisdiction over them."'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review jurisdictional
rules pertaining to non-resident defendants."2
The Supreme Court held that Florida properly exercised juris-
diction over Rudzewicz in this matter."3 Reemphasizing its rul-
forum State." Id. at 298 (citing Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176
N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961)).
107. Id. at 299.
108. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 464 (1985).
109. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 468. In Burger King, John Rudzewicz and Brian MacSha-
ra, both domiciled in Michigan, jointly applied for a Burger King franchise at Burger King's
district office in Birmingham, Michigan. Id. at 466. Rudzewicz provided the financial
backing for the franchise, while MacShara was to manage it. Id. Negotiations over issues
such as building design and rent took place, with both the Birmingham office and Burger
King's headquarters in Miami, Florida. Id. at 467. After a successful start to the business
in the summer of 1979, business dropped off due to a slowing economy later that year. Id.
at 468. Eventually, Rudzewicz and MacShara fell behind in their rent payments to the
Florida office, and Burger King terminated the franchise. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 468.
Nonetheless, Rudzewicz and MacShara continued to operate the Burger King franchise. Id.
Subsequently, Burger King filed suit against Rudzewicz and MacShara in federal court in
the Southern District of Florida. Id. In defense, Rudzewicz and MacShara argued that the
Southern District of Florida did not have jurisdiction over them, because they were not
residents of Florida and Burger King's alleged injury did not occur in Florida. Id. at 469.
The District Court determined that it had jurisdiction over Rudzewicz and MacShara, rul-
ing in favor of Burger King, and Rudzewicz alone subsequently appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held that the
District Court could not exercise jurisdiction over Rudzewicz, because the events that took
place in the case made it unreasonable to expect him to defend suit in Florida. Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 470.
110. Id. at 468.
111. Id. at 469.
112. Id. at 470-71.
113. Id. at 487.
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ings from prior jurisdictional cases, the Court held that a state
could not exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, un-
less the defendant had at least minimum contacts with the forum
state and demonstrated forum-directed activity, such that the de-
fendant purposefully availed itself of the protections of the forum
state's laws."4 The Court reiterated that a defendant, given his
relationship with the forum state, must have the reasonable ex-
pectation that he could face suit in the forum state."' Important-
ly, the Court added to the states' power to exercise jurisdiction
over a defendant by providing that a foreign defendant could not
escape the jurisdiction of another state just because the defendant
was never present in that state."6 However, the Court cautioned
that a foreign defendant's contract with a party from another state
did not demonstrate the contacts necessary to validate that state's
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant."'
Analyzing this case, the Supreme Court found ample evidence of
record connecting Rudzewicz with the forum state, thus validating
Florida's exercise of jurisdiction over him."8  For example, al-
though Rudzewicz and MacShara maintained no offices or opera-
tions in Florida, the partners nonetheless negotiated the franchise
agreement with Burger King's Florida office, paid all of their rent
to the Florida office, and communicated all of their disputes and
concerns to the Florida office."9 The Court believed that it was
apparent that the Florida office was vital to the partner's relation-
ship with Burger King.120 Additionally, the franchise document
114. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945)). Arguing the importance of minimum contacts, the Court provided that "the consti-
tutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established 'minimum
contacts' in the forum State." Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 473. Assimilating concepts of purposeful availment, foreseeability, and the
stream of commerce, the Court quoted significant language from World-Wide Volkswagen,
providing that a "'[sitate does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it
asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
State and those products subsequently injure forum consumers." Id. (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)).
116. Id. at 476. The Court made the assertion that "blurisdiction in these circumstances
may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum State."
Id.
117. Id. at 478. The Court pointedly stated that "[i]f the question is whether an individ-
ual's contract with an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish sufficient mini-
mum contacts in the other party's home forum, we believe the answer clearly is that it
cannot." Id.
118. Id. at 478-79.
119. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479-81.
120. Id. at 480.
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contained a choice-of-law provision providing that the franchise
agreement was governed according to the laws of Florida.121 While
not dispositive, the Court found that the choice-of-law provision
supported the notion that it was foreseeable that litigation could
occur in Florida.22 The Court believed that each of these factors
demonstrated intentional, forum directed conduct by Rudzewicz
2
1
In short, the Court found that Rudzewicz purposefully availed
himself of the protection of Florida, making the possibility of suit
in Florida foreseeable and the exercise of jurisdiction by the state
proper."'
E. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court
In 1987, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clearly de-
fine how substantial a non-resident defendant's contacts with the
forum state needed to be for the appropriate exercise of jurisdic-
tion.'25 Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court presented the
Court with a significant occasion to address the impact of impor-
tant factors, such as foreseeability, purposeful availment, and the
stream of commerce.' 26 However, Asahi resulted in two competing
jurisdictional standards for the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign
defendants that would cloud the jurisdictional landscape for over
two decades.127
In 1978, Gary Zurcher was driving on Interstate 80 in Solano
County, California when he collided with a tractor after losing
control of his motorcycle, seriously injuring himself and killing his
wife. 12 Zurcher filed suit in California state court, alleging that a
defective tire tube caused the accident.29  Zurcher sued, inter alia,
the manufacturer of the tube, Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial
Company ("Cheng Shin") from Taiwan and Asahi Metal Industry
Company ("Asahi"), the Japanese manufacturer who made the
tube's valve assembly."' Subsequently, Cheng Shin filed a cross-
claim against Asahi, believing that Asahi was fully aware that
121. Id. at 481.
122. Id. at 482.
123. Id.
124. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 487.
125. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
plurality).
126. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
127. Id. at 105, 116.
128. Id. at 105 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
129. Id. at 105-06.
130. Id. at 106.
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Cheng Shin sold its products, which incorporated Asahi's prod-
ucts, in California.' However, Asahi contended that California's
exercise of jurisdiction over it was invalid, because Asahi sold its
valve assemblies to Cheng Shin and did not know that those sales
could lead to the possibility of suit in California. 13' The Supreme
Court of California determined that California's exercise of juris-
diction was appropriate, because it was foreseeable that Asahi's
product, which was a part in Cheng Shin's product, would even-
tually be sold in California.
13
Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality, did not find Asahi's
contacts with California sufficient for the state to have jurisdiction
over Asahi, considering the burden on Asahi in forcing it to defend
suit in California.3 The plurality held that the contacts between
the non-resident defendant and the forum state must be the result
of conduct by the defendant intentionally targeting the forum
state.135 Justice O'Connor found that a defendant introducing its
product into the stream of commerce, without other conduct that
specifically targeted the forum state, was not intentional, forum-
directed conduct.' 3' Additionally, Justice O'Connor listed several
examples of actions that demonstrate intentional, forum-directed
conduct, such as, marketing, advertising, sales solicitation, or sell-
ing products through a distributor in the forum state.13' The crux
of Justice O'Connor's argument was that knowledge alone that the
stream of commerce could take a foreign defendant's product into
131. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106-07 (O'Connor, J., plurality). The only claim in this suit that
the parties did not settle out of court was Cheng Shin's cross-claim against Asahi. Id. at
106.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 108. The Superior Court of California initially ruled against Asahi, finding
that Asahi should have been prepared to defend suit anywhere in the world, because it did
business all over the world. Id. at 107. Subsequently, "[tihe Court of Appeal of the State of
California issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the Superior Court to quash
service of summons," reasoning that it would not be fair to subject Asahi to jurisdiction
based on foreseeability alone. Id. at 107-08.
134. Id. at 114, 116.
135. Id. at 112. Justice O'Connor specifically stated that the relationship "between the
defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come
about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State." Id. (cit-
ing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).
136. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O'Connor, J., plurality). Justice O'Connor argued that
"[t]he placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of
the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State." Id.
137. Id.
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the forum state was insufficient to provide that state with juris-
diction over the defendant.'38
Given these principles, Justice O'Connor determined that Asahi
took no action purposefully availing itself of the benefits and pro-
tection of California law.9 Asahi had no offices, operations, mar-
keting, or sales efforts in California. 4 ' Asahi only had knowledge
that its product entered the stream of commerce.' Furthermore,
Asahi's sole act of selling its tube valve assemblies to Cheng Shin
did not lead to any circumstances where Asahi should have rea-
sonably expected to defend suit in California."' Therefore, Justice
O'Connor ruled that Asahi did not have the minimum contacts
necessary to subject it to the jurisdiction of California.'43
Justice Brennan authored a concurring opinion, agreeing that
Asahi should not have been subject to jurisdiction in California
because it would have been overly burdensome to force Asahi to
defend suit in California, but disagreeing with Justice O'Connor's
stream of conunerce analysis.' Justice Brennan believed that
placing a product into the stream of commerce, with knowledge
that it would end up in the forum state, was enough to subject a
non-resident defendant to jurisdiction in that state. Justice
Brennan argued that the stream of commerce was not a set of
randomly occurring events, but a predictable path that products
follow from manufacturer to consumer.'46 Additionally, Justice
Brennan asserted that after a defendant's product makes its way
through the stream of commerce to the consumer in the forum
state, that defendant benefits from the sales revenue and protec-
138. Id. The plurality further asserted that "a defendant's awareness that the stream of
commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act
of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum
State." Id. (emphasis added).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 112-13.
141. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
142. See id. at 112-13.
143. Id. at 116.
144. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 117. Supporting his argument, Justice Brennan provided that "most courts
and commentators have found that jurisdiction premised on the placement of a product into
the stream of commerce is consistent with the Due Process Clause, and have not required a
showing of additional conduct." Id.
146. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). Specifically, Justice Brennan
argued that "[t]he stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to




tion of that state's laws.' 47 This occurs whether or not the defen-
dant took any action specifically targeting the forum state.4 8 Fi-
nally, Justice Brennan distinguished Asahi from World-Wide
Volkswagen.'49  Justice Brennan noted that in World-Wide
Volkswagen, the defective product reached the forum state by the
conduct of the consumer, while in Asahi, the defective product
reached the forum state because the manufacturer placed it into
the stream of commerce.' Therefore, Justice Brennan believed
that placing a product into the stream of commerce, with know-
ledge that the final product will be sold in the forum state, made it
reasonable to compel a non-resident defendant to defend suit in
that forum state.'
V. THE FAILURE OF MCINTYRE
McIntyre presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to
resolve an issue that has plagued jurisdictional analysis for over
twenty-four years.'52 Since 1987, courts have been in a state of
flux and uncertainty, resulting from the questions presented by
the Asahi decision."' In McIntyre, the Supreme Court set out to
resolve the jurisdictional questions left unanswered by the Asahi
decision." Ultimately, the Court would provide no more clarity or
direction than what existed immediately following Asahi in
1987."'
147. Id. Justice Brennan asserted that "[a] defendant who has placed goods in the
stream of commerce benefits economically from the retail sale of the final product in the
forum State, and indirectly benefits from the State's laws that regulate and facilitate com-
mercial activity." Id.
148. Id. Justice Brennan argued that the benefits of selling a product in the forum State
"accrue regardless of whether that participant directly conducts business in the forum
State, or engages in additional conduct directed toward that State." Id.
149. Id. at 120 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 306-07
(1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
150. See id.
151. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
152. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (Kennedy, J.,
plurality) (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 107 (O'Connor, J., plurality)).
153. Matthew R. Huppert, Comment, Commercial Purpose as Constitutional Purpose:
Reevaluating Asahi Through the Lens of International Patent Litigation, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 624, 625 (2011) (citing Kristin R. Baker, Comment, Product Liability Suits and the
Stream of Commerce After Asahi: World-Wide Volkswagen is Still the Answer, 35 TULSA
L.J. 705, 705 (2000)).
154. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
155. See id. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("I take heart that the plurality opinion
does not speak for the Court. .. ").
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A. The Missed Opportunity of McIntyre
The Asahi decision carried no majority opinion, leaving courts
with two options to choose from when determining jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant.56  One option was Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion, which advocated the purposeful
availment standard.' The other option was Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion, which supported a foreseeability approach."'
As a result of the schism in Asahi, courts were unable to uniformly
apply one set of rules regarding a state's exercise of jurisdiction
over a foreign defendant.'59
The stark conceptual differences between Justice O'Connor's
opinion and Justice Brennan's opinion have led to an inconsistent
application of the law.'6 ° Many courts have chosen to apply Justice
O'Connor's more stringent standard, which has made it more diffi-
cult for the forum state to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant in those jurisdictions."' Some courts have chosen Jus-
tice Brennan's far less rigid standard, which has made the exer-
cise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant easier in those
jurisdictions. 2 Still, some courts have declined to choose between
the two standards.' McIntyre presented the Supreme Court with
the opportunity to make such a choice.' Despite this pivotal oc-
casion to clarify the law from Asahi and the resulting discrepan-
cies, the Supreme Court failed.
156. Huppert, supra note 153, at 625.
157. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
158. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
159. Huppert, supra note 153, at 642. Huppert outlined the resulting disarray from
Asahi, stating that, "filn the wake of Asahi, lower courts have divided over the proper con-
stitutional standard for the stream-of-commerce theory. Some have followed Brennan,
some have followed O'Connor, and some have declined to decide between the two." Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 625. According to Huppert, five of the federal circuit courts have chosen to
adopt Justice O'Connor's standard. Id. (citing Angela M. Laughlin, This Ain't the Texas
Two Step Folks: Disharmony, Confusion, and the Unfair Nature of Personal Jurisdiction
Analysis in the Fifth Circuit, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 681, 727-28 app.A (2009)).
162. Id. At the same time, Huppert noted that three of the federal circuit courts have
chosen Justice Brennan's standard. Id. (citing Laughlin, supra note 161, 727-28 app.A).
163. Id. Still, another five of the federal circuit courts have refused to decide between
Justice O'Connor's and Justice Brennan's standard. Id. (citing Laughlin, supra note 161,
727-28).




The McIntyre decision was remarkably similar to Asahi and
paralleled it in several aspects.'65 Factually, both McIntyre and
Asahi involved foreign manufacturers whose products caused in-
jury in the United States, but who claimed that their contacts
with the forum states were insufficient to subject them to jurisdic-
tion.'66 Additionally, in McIntyre, Justice Kennedy embraced and
implemented Justice O'Connor's purposeful availment standard.'
67
Further, Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, argued a less stringent
jurisdictional standard, a position similar to that of Justice Bren-
nan.6 ' Finally, with no majority opinion, the McIntyre Court left
the state of jurisdictional law over a foreign defendant just as un-
clear as Asahi, with lower courts remaining free to continue to
choose between Justice O'Connor's and Justice Brennan's stan-
dards.'69
B. What the Court Should Have Done
With the opportunity to bring clarity to an important and com-
plex area of law, the Supreme Court should have adopted a juris-
dictional standard in a majority opinion. The Court's failure to
adopt any standard left the state of the law on jurisdiction over
foreign defendants unstable and muddled.7 ° Additionally, the Su-
preme Court should not have adopted either Justice O'Connor's
strict purposefully availed standard or Justice Brennan's lenient
foreseeability standard. Careful review and consideration of
World-Wide Volkswagen would have provided the Court with the
appropriate precedent needed to decide the McIntyre case.171
The most detrimental mistake that the Supreme Court made in
McIntyre was its failure to assemble a majority to affirm or devel-
op a constitutionally appropriate standard. Jurisdictional law is
one of the most important facets of the American legal system,
and to leave such an important matter in a state of flux is harmful
to the country both legally and economically. Legally, Asahi and
165. Compare McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (Kennedy, J., plurality), with Asahi Metal In-
dus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (O'Connor, J., plurality).
166. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., plurality); Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105-07
(O'Connor, J., plurality).
167. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790-91 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
168. Compare McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794-2806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), with Asahi,
480 U.S. at 116-21 (Brennan, J., concurring).
169. See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Huppert, supra note
153, at 625 (citing Baker, supra note 153, at 731).
170. Huppert, supra note 153, at 642.
171. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-98 (1980).
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McIntyre have left the law regarding jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants unstable and complex. 7 2 The split among the
federal circuit courts demonstrates the complexity of the issue and
the difficulty lower courts have when determining if they have
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant."' Economically, jurisdic-
tional uncertainty has the potential to allow manufacturers to
manipulate the jurisdictional system.'74 For example, manufac-
turers may more frequently make use of independent distributors
to sell their products in jurisdictions applying Justice O'Connor's
standard.'75 This would allow manufacturers to avoid litigation in
markets where they derive an economic benefit.17 6 Alternatively,
the same manufacturers may prevent their products from being
sold in a jurisdiction utilizing Justice Brennan's approach. 7 7 This
would deny the manufacturers the opportunity to exploit that
market for revenue and consumers the opportunity to purchase
the manufacturers' products.
Neither Justice O'Connor's standard nor Justice Brennan's
standard produce a satisfying result in many conceivable situa-
tions.7 9 It is difficult to argue that Justice O'Connor's standard
comports with the notions of fair play and substantial justice
when it would allow a non-resident defendant to elude jurisdiction
simply by using an independent distributor.8 ' Additionally, it is
conceivable that Justice O'Connor's standard may provide less
incentive for manufacturers to work towards designing and build-
ing safer products, if all that is necessary to avoid jurisdiction is
an independent distributor. T8
At the same time, under Justice Brennan's standard, it would
not be fair to subject a defendant to jurisdiction where a defendant
never intended to receive an economic benefit.'82 Perhaps a manu-
facturer's product could end up in a far-reaching location by the
172. Baker, supra note 153, at 731.
173. See id.
174. See Huppert, supra note 153, at 660-61; David E. Seidelson, A Supreme Court Con-
clusion and Two Rationales that Defy Comprehension: Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Su-
perior Court of California, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 563, 579 (1987).
175. See, e.g., Huppert, supra note 153, at 661; Seidelson, supra note 174, at 579.
176. See, e.g., Huppert, supra note 153, at 661; Seidelson, supra note 174, at 579.
177. See Huppert, supra note 153, at 660.
178. Cf id.
179. See, e.g., Huppert, supra note 153, at 660-61; Seidelson, supra note 174, at 579.
180. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2794-95 (2011) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting); see also Huppert, supra note 153, at 661; Seidelson, supra note 174, at 579.
181. Cf. Huppert, supra note 153, at 661; Seidelson, supra note 174, at 579.
182. See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
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unilateral action of a distributor.' The modern economic climate
has made the stream of commerce a complex entity, with the abili-
ty to take products to far-reaching places."' Although a defen-
dant's product ends up in the forum state, it does not mean that
the defendant intended for its product to end up in that state or to
derive an economic benefit from that state.
Jurisdictional analysis and the stream of commerce theory are
complex and challenging areas of law.' The fact that the McIn-
tyre court was unable to move forward from the position of the also
divided Asahi Court demonstrates the multifaceted and divisive
aspects of this area of the law. Therefore, there is good reason
why the Supreme Court has been unable to adopt a standard with
a majority of the Court. However, the fact that Justice O'Connor's
and Justice Brennan's standards often produce unsatisfying re-
sults should have signaled the Court to either develop an entirely
new standard, or to look to other precedent for guidance. Had the
Court looked closer at World-Wide Volkswagen, it would have
found a workable approach grounded in precedent.
186
The Supreme Court should have looked to World-Wide Volkswa-
gen to find the suitable standard to apply in cases involving juris-
diction over a non-resident defendant.'87 In World-Wide Volkswa-
gen, Justice White essentially argued that there were three factors
required to assert jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant un-
der a stream of commerce analysis: (1) placement of a defendant's
product into the stream of commerce; (2) knowledge that the prod-
uct could reach the forum state; and (3) foreseeability or anticipa-
tion of suit in the forum state.'88 Justice White's opinion demon-
183. Id. Note Justice Kennedy's hypothetical regarding a small Florida farmer who
would be forced to defend suit in Alaska due to the actions of a distributor under a fore-
seeability approach. Id.
184. See id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring); Huppert, supra note 153, at 626.
185. See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791; Huppert, supra note 153, at 626. Huppert de-
scribed the stream of commerce as "deeper, faster, and more interconnected in the... years
since Asahi." Huppert, supra note 153, at 626.
186. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-98 (1980).
187. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-98.
188. See id. Specifically, Justice White indicated that the knowledge, or "expectation,"
that a defendant's product could reach the forum state, in addition to placement of that
product into the stream of commerce, was a requirement for exercising jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant, when he stated that "[tihe forum State does not exceed its powers
under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that
delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased by consumers in the forum State." Id. at 297-98 (citing Gray v. Am. Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961)). In regards to foreseeability, Justice
White argued that "'foreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for person-
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strated that each factor is necessary to assert jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant, because no factor is mutually exclusive.9 In
other words, without one factor, the other factors either cannot
exist or are irrelevant. 90
The Court determined that although foreseeability alone was
not enough to determine jurisdiction, it was not entirely irrele-
vant, because the defendant's behavior and relationship with the
forum state established whether the defendant should reasonably
expect to face suit in that state. ' 91 Importantly, Justice White ar-
gued that where a defendant anticipates suit in a state, that de-
fendant has notice that it could be haled into court in that state,
allowing the defendant to mitigate the burdens of defending
suit. 192
Additionally, in World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice White further
provided that the unilateral or independent conduct of someone
claiming a connection with the defendant cannot subject a defen-
dant to jurisdiction.'93 Under World-Wide Volkswagen, the unila-
teral act exception emphasized the idea that a defendant should
not be subject to jurisdiction in a state where it could not reasona-
bly anticipate litigation."' Conceptually, this notion is crucial be-
cause the jurisdictional standard set forth in World-Wide
Volkswagen tends to be more permissive, in that it would be easier
to get jurisdiction over a defendant under World-Wide Volkswa-
al jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause," but that this does not mean "that foreseea-
bility is wholly irrelevant." Id. at 295, 297. Showing that foreseeability was an important
factor in determining whether a state could exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant,
Justice White stated that the "foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not
the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that
the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should rea-
sonably anticipate being haled into court there." Id. at 297 (citing Kulko v. Super. Ct., 436
U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)). Thus, Justice White
contended that, when a corporation purposefully avails itself of the forum state, "it has
clear notice that it is subject to suit there," but that such notice could arise by any effort by
a manufacturer to serve, "directly or indirectly," the forum state. World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added). Although Justice White argued that purposeful avail-
ment provided "clear notice" of being subject to suit in a state, the fact that he also stated
that an indirect effort to serve the forum state could also subject a foreign defendant to the
jurisdiction of the forum state leads to a more lenient standard. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. Id. at 295, 297-98.
192. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. The ways in which a defendant can miti-
gate the risk of suit include purchasing insurance, passing on increased costs to customers,
or avoiding any relationship with a state altogether. Id.
193. Id. at 298 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
194. Id. at 297-98.
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gen, as opposed to Justice O'Connor's standard.9 ' However, the
unilateral act exception allays the concerns Justice Kennedy arti-
culated, regarding the possibility of a defendant facing suit in a
far-reaching state as a result of the actions of a large distributor.9
World-Wide Volkswagen provides an appropriate balance be-
tween Justice O'Connor's and Justice Brennan's standards. After
a foreign defendant puts a product into the stream of commerce,
both knowledge that the product could reach the forum state and
the foreseeability of suit in the forum state are necessary to sub-
ject that defendant to jurisdiction in that state."' This notion pre-
vents a manufacturer from being forced to defend suit in a state
that the manufacturer never intentionally targeted and where
only one of its products ended up.'98 At the same time, a manufac-
turer cannot escape jurisdiction in a state where its products
cause harm, simply by utilizing an independent distributor.9
This combination of factors, which courts should examine before
the exercise of jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, produces
the most equitable result.
Both Justice O'Connor's standard and Justice Brennan's stan-
dard have the potential to produce rather undesirable results.
Nevertheless, the most undesirable result is having no uniform
standard to apply whatsoever. The already existing precedent
from World-Wide Volkswagen provides a workable hybrid of Jus-
tice O'Connor's and Justice Brennan's standards, which the Court
could have reaffirmed in an effort to simplify and clarify the troub-
ling state of jurisdictional law. Therefore, in McIntyre, a majority
of the Court should have reaffirmed World-Wide Volkswagen and
done away with the split opinion of Asahi.
C. The Effect of McIntyre on the Modern Economic World
Moving forward, the state of the law on non-resident jurisdic-
tion will likely remain unchanged. Much like Asahi, McIntyre on-
ly provided a plurality opinion leaving courts free, once again, to
195. Compare id. at 287-99 (articulating the placement, knowledge, and foreseeability
standard), with Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105 (O'Connor, J., plurality) (arguing for the purposeful-
ly availed standard).
196. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). See
also J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011) (Kennedy, J., plurali-
ty).
197. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-98.
198. See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
199. Cf Huppert, supra note 153, at 661; Seidelson, supra note 174, at 579.
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adopt Justice O'Connor's standard, Justice Brennan's approach, or
neither of the two.00 In a time of harsh economics, where business
abhors uncertainty, it is a shame that the Supreme Court added to
that uncertainty, with its inability to provide a workable out-of-
state defendant jurisdictional standard. Hopefully, another twen-
ty-four years will not pass before the Supreme Court has the op-
portunity to tackle this seemingly insurmountable problem.
Richard B. Koch, Jr.
200. See Huppert, supra note 153, at 642.
229

